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Abstract
The logic LAEq discussed in this paper is based on an approximate entail-
ment relation. LAEq generalises classical propositional logic to the effect
that conclusions can be drawn with a quantified imprecision. To this end,
properties are modelled by subsets of a distance space and statements are of
the form that one property implies another property within a certain limit of
tolerance. We adopt the conceptual framework defined by E. Ruspini; our
work is towards a contribution to the investigation of suitable logical calculi.
LAEq is based on the assumption that the distance function is a quasimetric.
We provide a proof calculus for LAEq and we show its soundness and com-
pleteness for finite theories. As our main tool for showing completeness, we
use a representation of proofs by means of weighted directed graphs.
1 Introduction
Reasoning about a particular topic means exploiting the logical relationships be-
tween potential facts. For instance, if we know that some property α applies and
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that α implies another property β, we draw the conclusion that then also β applies.
Under practical circumstances, however, reasoning is often done in a somewhat
flexible way. In fact, we typically draw the indicated conclusion even if the pres-
ence of α does not imply β strictly. Knowing that whenever α holds we are in a
situation close to a situation in which β holds is often considered as a sufficient
basis for an inference. Reasoning in such a way might be called “approximate”
and its formalisation is the topic of the present paper.
Approximate reasoning can be realised in many different ways. For an overview
of the many different approaches to this field, see, e.g., [HAH]. Here, we adopt the
conceptual framework that has been specified by E. Ruspini in his seminal paper
[Rus] in 1991.
Let us outline the main ideas. Assume that we are given a set of properties, suitable
to describe some objects under consideration. Let a universe of discourse W , cus-
tomarily called a set of worlds, be chosen, corresponding to the different possible
states in which the objects can be. We may then assume that at each world w an
evaluation assigns to each property ϕ its truth value “true” or “false”. Likewise,
with each property ϕ we may associate the subset of W consisting of those worlds
at which ϕ holds. In this framework, the canonical way of reasoning obeys the
rules of classical propositional logic (CPL). In particular, implicational relation-
ships correspond to subsethood: for two properties α and β to validate α → β
means that the set A ⊆ W associated with α is contained in the set B ⊆ W
associated with β.
Practical reasoning, however, should be robust with regard to small changes. To
allow for greater flexibility, Ruspini takes into account an additional aspect. The set
of worlds describes the variety of states of the objects under consideration and there
might be a natural way to specify the degree to which two such states resemble. A
similarity relation on W can be introduced for this purpose, mapping each pair of
worlds v, w ∈ W to an element s(v, w) of the real unit interval, a larger value
meaning a stronger resemblance. Such a mapping can be understood as a graded
version of an accessibility relation in the sense of modal logic. In fact, for any
given r ∈ [0, 1], we may define the binary relation Rr on W requiring v Rr w if
s(v, w) > r. Based on Rr, we may define a possibility operator ♦r on the power
set of W . The expression α → ♦rβ then generalises the classical implication.
At a world w at which α is fulfilled, β might not hold but still be regarded as an
“example” of β. However, w will be a “typical example” only if r = 1. For r close
to 1, w might still be considered as a “good example”, but for small r, the world w
would be considered as a “bad example”.
Ruspini’s approach has been explored from a logical perspective in a series of pa-
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pers by numerous authors. A comprehensive study is the paper [EGGR]. The paper
[DPEGG] is a further early contribution and includes an application to interpola-
tive reasoning as required in rule-based fuzzy control. For a more recent article,
which contains an overview of different approaches, see [GoRo].
A logical calculus may also be based on a graded analogue of the classical implica-
tion, without the detour via modal operators. In fact, Ruspini defines the degree of
implication between properties α and β modelled by subsetsA andB, respectively,
by
I(B|A) = inf
v∈A
sup
w∈B
s(v, w).
We may hence define that α implies β to the degree r if I(B|A) > r. This idea is
exploited in the Ph.D. Thesis of R. Rodrı´guez [Rod] and is moreover the basis of
the paper [EGRV].
The logic LAEq that we consider in this paper is conceptually in line with these last
mentioned papers. Details differ, but our modifications do not affect the overall
picture. Our syntactical objects are of the form
α
d→ β, (1)
where α and β are formulas of CPL and d is a positive real number (possibly
0). The two CPL formulas are interpreted by subsets of a quasimetric space. A
quasimetric is defined similarly to a metric, but the axiom of symmetry is dropped.
The statement (1) is defined to be satisfied if the set of worlds associated with α
is contained in the d-neighbourhood of the set associated with β. We note that we
work with a quasimetric and not with the dual notion of a quasisimilarity. For this
reason the values associated with formulas are interpreted in the reverse way: the
statement α d→ β is the weaker, the larger the parameter d is. In particular, α 0→ β
holds whenever α→ β is a tautology of CPL.
LAEq could be regarded as a logic of quasimetric spaces. A different perspective
on logics of metric spaces as well as logics of more general distance spaces has
been developed in a further series of papers. In [KSSWZ], first-order logic on uni-
verses endowed with a distance function is studied. Related contributions include
[SSWZ], [Kut], and [STWZ].
We may furthermore ask for the connections of our work to many-valued logic.
We deal with implications between crisp properties, endowed with real values that
express the degree to which the implicational relationships hold. The notion of
a Graded Consequence Relation between sets of Boolean formulas and a further
Boolean formula has been introduced by Chakraborty [Cha, ChDu]. A central aim
has been the adaptation of common logical concepts to a many-valued framework.
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In spite of the distinct scopes, Chakraborty’s notion shares conceptually certain
aspects with our framework: crisp properties are dealt with on the base level, a
degree is added on the metalevel. An exact relationship has been established, how-
ever, only in a more general context. Namely, Graded Consequence Relations were
generalised to hold between a fuzzy subset of formulas and a further formula; see,
e.g., [DuCh, REGG]. In [REGG], it is pointed out that Implicative Closure Op-
erators capture the approximate entailment relation on which the present work is
based.
The present work follows up the previous papers [Rod, GoRo, EGRV]. To see in
which respect our work represents a progress, let us go further into detail. The
present approach differs in two important points from [EGRV]. Firstly, the logic
discussed in [EGRV] is not based on a quasimetric but on a similarity relation.
The relationship between a quasimetric and a similarity relation is an indirect one:
a metric is a symmetric quasimetric and a similarity relation can be regarded as a
generalisation of a metric. Secondly, in [EGRV], the language is required to consist
of a fixed finite number of variables and each world is assumed to correspond to
what is called a maximal elementary conjunction, or m.e.c. for short. A m.e.c. is a
conjunction of literals in which all variables occur exactly once. Here, m.e.c.s are
not used.
The latter aspect has in fact been the starting point for the present work: we no
longer assume that the number of variables is bound by a fixed finite number. This
change implies that we can not proceed in the same way as, e.g., in [EGRV]. The
axiomatisation of the logic cannot be done in the same style as before and the
methods employed in completeness proofs are no longer available, as there is no
counterpart of a m.e.c. here. In the proof system proposed in [EGRV], there are two
axioms that rely on m.e.c.s. The first one expresses the symmetry of the distance
function; it corresponds to the requirement that if a world is in the d-neighbourhood
of another world, also the converse relation holds. A further axiom is concerned
with disjunctions; it corresponds to the fact that if a world is in the neighbourhood
of the union of two sets, then it is already in the neighbourhood of one of them.
A previous work whose aim has been to replace these two axioms is our contri-
bution [Vet]. In this case, we introduced an additional binary connective ↗. For
two subsets A and B of a metric space, A↗ B was supposed to contain all those
elements whose distance to A is at most as large as their distance to B. The same
connective has also been considered in the framework of Logics of Comparative
Similarity; see, e.g., [AOS]. The presence of↗ enabled us to overcome the prob-
lem of characterising the neighbourhood of the union of sets. The problem of
characterising the symmetry of the distance function was not touched; symmetry
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was not assumed.
Here, we do not extend the language by additional connectives. Instead, we pose
a seemingly natural question: Do we really need the axioms involving m.e.c.s for
the axiomatisation of a logic of approximate entailment? Could it be the case that
the remaining axioms are already sufficient?
We contribute a step towards an affirmation of the latter question. In fact, using
quasimetrics as distance functions, we provide a positive answer. For the associated
approximate entailment relation, we present a proof calculus that is restricted to the
obviously necessary minimum of rules; nonetheless, we establish its soundness and
completeness. We again have to include a finiteness condition though; we show the
completeness of our calculus w.r.t. finite theories.
We proceed as follows. In the introductory Section 2, we specify the logic LAEq,
which deals with graded implications of the form (1) and interprets properties by
subsets of a quasimetric space. Section 3 introduces the calculus LAE, based on
a small set of rules that are sound for LAEq. We furthermore establish that proofs
in LAE can be represented in the form of weighted directed forests, which are
directed graphs whose components are directed trees. In Section 4, we present a
representation theorem for quasimetric Boolean algebras. Section 5 then estab-
lishes our final result, according to which provability in LAE coincides with the
entailment relation of LAEq. Some concluding remarks are contained in Section 6.
2 The Logic of Approximate Entailment
in Quasimetric Spaces
We are concerned in this paper with a logic of approximate entailment; our work
may be seen as a continuation of the contributions [Rod, GoRo, EGRV] to this
topic. The logics that have been considered under this name often differ in details.
Here, our intention is to define and axiomatise a logic in close accordance with the
original concepts of Ruspini, presented in his well-known paper [Rus].
Let us specify the semantic framework. The symbol R¯+ will denote the extended
positive real line, that is, R¯+ = R+ ∪ {∞} = {r ∈ R : r > 0} ∪ {∞}. Here,∞
is a new element such that r < ∞ for any r ∈ R+. We extend the addition from
R+ to R¯+ requiring r +∞ = ∞ + r = ∞ for any r ∈ R¯+. The operations of
minimum and maximum on R¯+ will be denoted by ∧ and ∨, respectively.
Definition 2.1. Let W be a non-empty set. A quasimetric on W is a mapping
q : W ×W → R¯+ such that for any v, w, x ∈W :
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(M1) q(v, w) = 0 if and only if v = w;
(M2) q(v, x) 6 q(v, w) + q(w, x).
In this case, we call (W, q) a quasimetric space.
In a quasimetric space (W, q), the distance of some a ∈ W from some B ⊆ W is
defined to be
q(a,B) = inf
b∈B
q(a, b).
Moreover, for d ∈ R¯+, we define the set
Ud(B) = {a ∈W : q(a,B) 6 d}
as the d-neighbourhood of B. Finally, the Hausdorff quasidistance of some A ⊆
W from some B ⊆W is
q(A,B) = sup
a∈A
q(a,B).
Note that we use the same symbol for the quasimetric, the distance of a point from
a set, and the Hausdorff quasidistance.
A quasimetric space (W, q) is called a min-space if, for any a ∈ W and B ⊆ W ,
there is a b ∈ B such that q(a,B) = q(a, b). This notion is due to [SSWZ], where
the importance of min-spaces in a logical setting has been pointed out.
Let us compile a few immediate observations.
Lemma 2.2. Let (W, q) be a quasimetric space, let a ∈ W , A,B ⊆ W , and
c, d ∈ R¯+.
(i) q(a,B) = 0 if a ∈ B. If (W, q) is a min-space, also the converse holds.
(ii) q(a,B) 6 d if and only if a ∈ Ud(B).
(iii) Ud(∅) = ∅ if d <∞, and U∞(∅) = W .
(iv) a ∈ Ud(B) if there is a b ∈ B such that q(a, b) 6 d. If (W, q) is a min-space,
also the converse holds.
(v) Uc(Ud(A)) ⊆ Uc+d(A).
Moreover, the following properties are characteristic for the Hausdorff quasidis-
tance.
6
Lemma 2.3. Let (W, q) be a quasimetric space and let A,B,C ⊆W .
(i) q(A,B) = 0 if A ⊆ B. If (W, q) is a min-space, also the converse holds.
(ii) q(A,B) 6 d if and only if A ⊆ Ud(B).
(iii) q(A ∪B,C) = q(A,C) ∨ q(B,C).
(iv) q(A,B) > q(A,C) if B ⊆ C.
(v) q(A,C) 6 q(A,B) + q(B,C).
Proof. We only show (v). We calculate
q(A,B) + q(B,C) = sup
a∈A
inf
b∈B
q(a, b) + sup
b∈B
inf
c∈C
q(b, c)
= sup
a∈A
inf
b∈B
(q(a, b) + sup
b′∈B
inf
c∈C
q(b′, c))
> sup
a∈A
inf
b∈B
(q(a, b) + inf
c∈C
q(b, c))
= sup
a∈A
inf
b∈B
inf
c∈C
(q(a, b) + q(b, c))
> sup
a∈A
inf
c∈C
q(a, c) = q(A,C).
We next specify the logic LAEq. The language of LAEq includes a countably infi-
nite number of variables, denoted by small Greek letters, as well as the two con-
stants ⊥ (false), and > (true). By a Boolean formula, we mean a formula built up
from the variables and the constants by means of the binary operations ∧ (and),
and ∨ (or), as well the unary operation ¬ (not). The connective → (implies), is
defined as usual.
Moreover, a graded implication, or an implication for short, is a triple consisting
of two Boolean formulas α and β as well as a number d ∈ R+. We write α d→ β
and we call d the degree of the implication.
A model for LAEq is a Boolean algebra (B;∩,∪, {,∅,W ) of subsets of a quasi-
metric space (W, q) such that for each A ∈ B and d ∈ R+ also Ud(A) ∈ B.
Given a model B, an evaluation is a mapping v from the Boolean formulas to
B in the sense of classical propositional logic. That is, we require v(α ∧ β) =
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v(α) ∩ v(β), v(α ∨ β) = v(α) ∪ v(β), v(¬α) = {v(α), and v(⊥) = ∅,
v(>) = W . An implication α d→ β is said to be satisfied by an evaluation v if
v(α) ⊆ Ud(v(β)).
A theory is a set of implications. We say that a theory T semantically entails some
implication Φ in LAEq if, whenever all elements of T are satisfied by an evaluation
v, also Φ is satisfied by v.
Having specified the logic LAEq in formal respects, let us now explain its intended
meaning. First of all, we deal with Boolean formulas, interpreted by subsets of a
fixed set of worlds. The Boolean formulas hence refer to crisp properties.
Furthermore, the role of the quasimetric is analogous to the role of the similarity
relation in Ruspini’s framework. A major difference is, however, that we do not
assume symmetry here. Substituting the similarity relation by a quasimetric more-
over means that the order is understood in the opposite way. Let q be a quasimetric
on a set of worlds W . Then, for two worlds v and w, q(v, w) = 0 means coinci-
dence, that is, v = w. Moreover, the larger q(v, w) is, the less the worlds v and w
resemble each other. Finally, q(v, w) = ∞ means that v and w are considered as
unrelated.
The use of the dual order has practical reasons; the proofs will be easier to follow.
A further advantage is that we are in line with the common topological terminol-
ogy. We note that, however, a quasimetric can be identified with a quasisimilarity
based on the product t-norm. Here, we understand a quasisimilarity similarly to a
similarity relation [Rus], but without assuming symmetry. It is straightforward to
see that under the correspondence [0, 1] → R¯+, d 7→
{
− ln d if d 6= 0,
∞ if d = 0 the two
concepts coincide.
Let us finally recall the meaning of an expression of the form α d→ β. This implica-
tion to be satisfied means that any world at which α holds is in the d-neighbourhood
of the set of worlds at with β holds. Conversely, if the implication is not satisfied,
then there is a worldw with the following property: α holds atw, and for all worlds
v at which β holds, we have q(w, v) > d. We conclude that the degree d of the
implication is a degree of imprecision: we may read α d→ β as “α implies β within
the limit of tolerance d”.
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3 The calculus LAE
The purpose of this paper is to define a proof system for LAEq. To this end we
introduce a calculus denoted by LAE.
Recall that the syntactical objects of LAEq are graded implications and that we do
not allow to build compound formulas from statements of the form (1) by means
of the classical connectives. Exactly this possibility is admitted in [EGRV], where
a two-level language is used. Accordingly, the calculus of [EGRV] is based on
axioms together with the modus ponens as the only rule.
Our calculus LAE will instead be based on rules, suitable to derive implications
from implications; there are no connectives on the metalevel. The style of LAE
might be considered as somewhat similar to Skolem’s calculus for lattice theory;
see, e.g., [NePl]. We are, in addition, inspired by the proof-theoretic methods
in fuzzy logics [MOG]; a remote resemblance with the sequent systems used in
substructural logic might thus be observable as well.
We assume from now on that the set of variables is fixed and that from these vari-
ables, all Boolean formulas and implications are built up.
A rule of LAE consists of a possibly empty set of implications, called the as-
sumptions, and one further implication, called the conclusion. We denote a rule
writing the assumptions, if there are any, above the conclusion, using a separating
horizontal line.
Definition 3.1. LAE consists of the following rules, whereα, β, γ are any Boolean
formulas and c, d ∈ R+:
(R1) α 0→ β if α→ β is a tautology of CPL (R2) α
0→ β
α ∧ γ 0→ β ∧ γ
(R3)
α
c→ β
α
d→ β
where d > c (R4)
α
c→ ⊥
α
0→ ⊥
(R5)
α
c→ γ β c→ γ
α ∨ β c→ γ
(R6)
α
c→ β β d→ γ
α
c+d→ γ
Let T be a theory and Φ be an implication. A proof of Φ from T in LAE is defined
in the usual way. We write T ` Φ if such a proof exists.
Comparing LAE with the axiom system of [EGRV, Def. 4.2], we may say that,
roughly, LAE incorporates the same axioms except for those involving m.e.c.s,
which are not available in the present context.
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Our aim is to show the completeness of LAE with regard to the consequence
relation of LAEq, that is, semantic entailment in LAEq coincides with provability
in LAE. The soundness part does not cause difficulties.
Proposition 3.2. Let T be a theory and Φ an implication. If T proves Φ in LAE,
then T semantically entails Φ in LAEq.
Proof. If the assumptions of a rule are satisfied by an evaluation v, the conclusion
is satisfied by v as well. This is clear for (R1)–(R5). In case of (R6), it follows
from Lemma 2.2(v).
In spite of the seeming simplicity of the calculus LAE, the proof of the converse
of Proposition 3.2, given in Section 5, is not trivial. In the remainder of the present
section, we will define a certain way of representing proofs of LAE.
We will call two Boolean formulas α and β Boolean equivalent, in signs α ≈ β,
if α → β and β → α are tautologies of CPL. Assume α ≈ α′ and β ≈ β′; then
the implications α d→ β and α′ d→ β′ are in LAE derivable from each other. In
fact, in this case α′ → α and β → β′ are tautologies of CPL, hence α′ 0→ α and
β
0→ β′ follow by (R1). From α d→ β, we may then derive α′ d→ β′ applying
twice (R6). Similarly, we may infer α′ d→ β′ from α d→ β. In the sequel, we will
consider Boolean formulas up to Boolean equivalence. Boolean formulas will in
fact be dealt with in disjunctive normal form.
Definition 3.3. A Boolean formula of the form ϕ or ¬ϕ, where ϕ is a variable,
will be called a literal. By a clause, we mean a finite set of literals, and by a clause
set, we mean a finite set of clauses. A clause L is called inconsistent if there is a
variable ϕ such that L contains both ϕ and ¬ϕ, and consistent otherwise.
With a clause set
B = { {λi1, . . . , λiki} : 1 6 i 6 l}, (2)
where l > 0 and k1, . . . , kl > 0, we associate the Boolean formula∨
16i6l
∧
16j6ki
λij
and denote it by f(B). Here, an empty conjunction stands for > and an empty
disjunction stands for ⊥.
We note that, in this paper, clause sets represent disjunctive normal forms. That is,
we interpret clauses conjunctively and sets of clauses disjunctively.
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Clearly, each Boolean formula α is Boolean equivalent to a formula associated
with a clause set. In particular, ⊥ is, e.g., associated with the empty set {}; and
> is, e.g., associated with the clause set consisting of a single empty clause, {{}}.
We will call a clause set B such that α≈ f(B) a clause set for α.
An implication of the following form is called basic:
λ1 ∧ . . . ∧ λn d→
∨
16i6l
∧
16j6ki
µij ; (3)
here, n > 1, l > 0, and k1, . . . , kl > 1; moreover, {λ1, . . . , λn} and {µi1, . . . , µiki},
i = 1, . . . , l, are consistent clauses. In particular, we may identify a basic implica-
tion with a triple consisting of a clause, a clause set, and a positive real.
A theory T consisting of basic implications will also be called basic. By the fol-
lowing lemma, we may restrict our considerations to basic theories.
Lemma 3.4. Let T be a theory. Then there is a basic theory Tb such that any
implication is provable from T if and only if it is provable from Tb.
Proof. Let us modify T as follows. Let α d→ β be contained in T . If ¬α or β is a
tautology of CPL, then α d→ β is derivable in LAEq by (R1) and (R3). In this case,
we drop it from T . W.l.o.g., we can otherwise assume that the implication is of the
form ∨
16i6l′
∧
16j6k′i
νij
d→
∨
16i6l
∧
16j6ki
µij ,
where l′ > 1 and l > 0 and, for all i, {νi1, . . . , νik′i}, {µi1, . . . , νiki} are non-empty
consistent clauses. We drop in this case α d→ β from T and add instead the basic
implications ∧
16j6k′i
νij
d→
∨
16i6l
∧
16j6ki
µij , (4)
where i = 1, . . . , l′. By repeated application of (R5), we can derive α d→ β from
the implications (4). Conversely, by (R1) and (R6), we can derive the implication
(4) for each i from α d→ β.
Proceeding in the same way for each element of T , we obtain a theory Tb that
consists of basic implications only.
In the sequel, we will identify proofs of LAE with certain weighted directed
graphs labelled by Boolean formulas. We will adopt the common terminology
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to denote the relationship between nodes, like child, father, sibling, and descen-
dant. Moreover, a directed forest is a directed graph such that each component is
a directed tree; the latter’s designated elements are called roots then. The nodes
without child are called terminal nodes or leaves. A subtree as well as the subtree
rooted at some node is understood in the obvious way. A branch is a maximal
subtree with the property that each non-terminal node has exactly one child.
A weighted directed forest is a directed forest together with a map assigning to each
edge a positive real number, called its weight. Finally, all graphs with which we
deal will be labelled. However, to facilitate formulations, the mapping associating
labels to nodes will be kept implicit; we will simply identify the nodes with their
labels.
Definition 3.5. A proof forest is a finite weighted directed forest each of whose
nodes is either a clause or the symbol >.
A node of a proof forest distinct from > is called proper. The length of a branch is
defined to be 0 if it contains > and else as the sum of the weights of its edges. By
the length of a proof forest, we mean the maximum of the lengths of its branches.
Let T be a basic theory and let ζ r→ η be an implication. Then a proof forest is
called a forest proof of ζ r→ η from T if the following conditions hold:
(T1) There is a clause set Bζ for ζ such that, for each clause L in Bζ , there
is a root that is a subset of L.
(T2) There is a clause setBη for η such that, for any terminal clause L, there
is a clause in Bη that is a subset of L.
(T3) The length of the proof forest is at most r.
(T4) Let L be a non-terminal clause. Then the weights of all edges rooted
at L coincide; let c be this value. One of the following possibilities
applies:
(A) c = 0 and T contains a basic implication of the form (3),
where d = 0, {λ1, . . . , λn} ⊆ L, and for each i = 1, . . . , l, a
clause L′ ⊆ {µi1, . . . , µiki} ∪ L is a child of L.
(B) c > 0 and T contains a basic implication of the form (3),
where d = c, {λ1, . . . , λn} ⊆ L, and for each i = 1, . . . , l, a
clause L′ ⊆ {µi1, . . . , µiki} is a child of L.
(C) c = 0, L is inconsistent, and > is the only child of L.
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(D) c = 0, and for some variable ϕ, called the splitting variable
in the sequel, L has exactly two children, one of which is a
clause consisting of ϕ and a subset of L and one of which is a
clause consisting of ¬ϕ and a subset of L.
For illustration, let us include an example. Figure 1 shows a forest proof of the
implication
α ∧ β 0.3→ (¬δ ∧ ε) ∨ (δ ∧ ¬ε)
from the theory
T = {α 0→ ¬β ∨ γ, β ∧ γ 0.3→ δ ∨ ε, δ 0→ ¬ε}.
The block used for α∧β is {{α, β}}; the block for (¬δ∧ε)∨ (δ∧¬ε) is {{¬δ, ε},
{δ,¬ε}}. Note that the length of the two branches not terminating with > is 0.3;
hence the length of the forest proof is 0.3. We observe furthermore that all four
cases of condition (T4) occur. For instance, at the root {α, β}, case (A) of (T4)
applies; at its child {β, γ}, case (B) applies; at the root’s child {β,¬β}, case (C)
applies; and at the node {δ}, case (D) applies.
Figure 1: An example of a forest proof. Set brackets are omitted.
The rest of this section is devoted to the aim of showing that provability in LAE
is equivalent to the existence of proof forests.
We next show the first out of several technical lemmas, according to which a forest
proof may be assumed to fulfil certain additional conditions.
Improper nodes are labelled by > and this symbol represents falsity. By the fol-
lowing lemma we can assume that the improper nodes are all terminal.
Lemma 3.6. Let there be a forest proof of ζ r→ η from a basic theory T . Then
there is a forest proof of ζ r→ η from T such that (i) any node > is terminal and
(ii) a node > does not have siblings.
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Proof. Consider a non-terminal node >. We remove all children of > together
with the subtrees rooted at them. Then the length of the proof forest is smaller than
before. Moreover, each terminal node of the modified proof is a terminal node of
the original proof; hence condition (T2) is still fulfilled. We conclude that the result
is a forest proof of ζ r→ η from T . Applying the same procedure in all applicable
cases, the first part follows.
Next, consider a clause L that has a child > as well as further children. Then case
(A) or (B) applies. Obviously, we can remove the subtree rooted at the child >.
Arguing as before, the second part follows as well.
Theorem 3.7. Let T be a basic theory, and let ζ r→ η be an implication. If there
is a forest proof of ζ r→ η from T , then T ` ζ r→ η.
Proof. By Lemma 3.6, we can assume that every node > is terminal and does not
possess siblings.
Let Bζ be a clause set for ζ according to (T1). If Bζ is empty, we have ζ ≈⊥ and
the assertion is clear from (R1) and (R3). Note that in this case the proof forest is
arbitrary. For the rest of the proof, we assume that Bζ is non-empty.
Let L¯ be any clause contained in Bζ and let us consider the tree whose root is a
subset of L¯. Our aim is to show T ` ∧ L¯ r→ η. As ζ is Boolean equivalent to the
disjunction of all conjunctions of a clause in Bζ , the assertion will then follow by
(R1) and (R5). We claim:
(?) Let L be a proper node. Let S be the subtree rooted at L and let e be the length
of S. Then
∧
L
e→ η is provable in LAE from T . Moreover, if all leaves of S are
>, then
∧
L
0→ ⊥ is provable in LAE from T .
Our assertion follows from (?) applied to the root. Based on the following facts
(a)–(c), (?) follows by induction over the subtrees.
(a) Let the clause L be a leaf. Then, by (T2),
∧
L
0→ η is a tautology of CPL and
hence derivable by (R1).
(b) Let L be a non-terminal clause and let > be its only child. We claim that then
T ` ∧L 0→ ⊥. Indeed, in case that (A) or (B) applies to L, T contains∧L′ c→ ⊥
for some L′ ⊆ L and c ∈ R+; by (R1) and (R4), the implication in question is
derivable. In case (C),
∧
L ≈ ⊥, and we draw the same conclusion. Case (D)
cannot apply.
(c) Let L be a non-terminal clause with the proper children L1, . . . , Ln. Let c be
the weight of the edges rooted at L. Assume that, for each i = 1, . . . , n, (?) holds
for Li. We claim that then T `
∧
L
c→ ∨i∧Li. Indeed, in case that (A) applies to
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L, let α 0→ β be the used basic implication from T . Then there is a conjunction γ
of literals such that α∧γ is Boolean equivalent with∧L and β∧α∧γ → ∨i∧Li
is a CPL tautology. We apply (R2) to prove α ∧ γ 0→ β ∧ α ∧ γ and by (R1), (R6)
we derive
∧
L
0→ ∨i∧Li. In case (B), we proceed similarly; the application of
(R2) being omitted. Case (C) cannot occur. In case (D), we use (R1).
Assume next that not all leaves of the subtree rooted at L are >. By assumption,
we have, for all i,
∧
Li
ei→ η, where ei is the length of the subtree rooted at Li. By
(R5), we can derive
∨
i
∧
Li
e→ η as well, where e is the largest value among the
ei, and by (R6) furthermore
∧
L
c+e→ η, and c+e is the length of the subtree rooted
at L.
Assume now that all leaves of the subtree rooted at L are >. By assumption, we
then have, for all i,
∧
Li
0→ ⊥. By (R5), (R6), and (R4), we derive ∧L 0→ ⊥. In
particular, we derive
∧
L
0→ η, and 0 is the length of the subtree rooted at L. The
proof of (?) is complete.
Lemma 3.8. Let there be a forest proof of ζ r→ η from a basic theory T . Then there
is a forest proof of ζ r→ η from T such that each inconsistent clause is non-terminal
and has the only child >.
Proof. Let ϕ be a variable and let L be a clause containing ϕ and ¬ϕ. If L is
non-terminal, we remove each child of L together with the subtree rooted at it.
Afterwards, we add > as the only child of L and we endow the edge from L to >
with the weight 0.
Then case (C) of condition (T4) applies at L. Furthermore, we readily check that
the modified forest proof is still a forest proof of ζ r→ η from T .
Theorem 3.9. Let T be a basic theory and let ζ r→ η be an implication. If T `
ζ
r→ η, then there is a forest proof of ζ r→ η from T .
Proof. By (T4), cases (A) or (B), each implication contained in T possesses a
forest proof.
We will now check for each of the rules (R1)–(R6) that whenever each assumption
possesses a forest proof, so does the conclusion. The assertion will then follow by
induction over the length of a proof in LAE.
Ad (R1). Let α → β be a tautology of CPL. Then there is a clause set Bα =
{L1, . . . , Ln} for α and a clause set Bβ for β such that, for each i, Li is a subset of
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a clause in Bβ . Then the forest that consists of the single node > if Bα is empty,
and of the isolated nodes Li otherwise is a forest proof of α
0→ β.
Ad (R2). Assume that there is a forest proof of α 0→ β. Let γ be any Boolean
formula; then there is also a forest proof of α ∧ γ 0→ β ∧ γ, as follows from the
following two observations.
First, let λ be a literal; we construct a forest proof of α ∧ λ 0→ β ∧ λ as follows.
If α ≈ ⊥, the forest proof consisting of the node > alone fulfils the requirement.
Otherwise, we add λ to the (proper) roots; and for all proper nodes L based on case
(A) or (D), we recursively add λ to the proper children of L if λ was added to L.
The result fulfils the requirements; for, if a node L is based on case (B) or (C), all
branches through L end up with >.
Second, assume that, for Boolean formulas γ1 and γ2, there are forest proofs of
α ∧ γ1 0→ β ∧ γ1 as well as α ∧ γ2 0→ β ∧ γ2. Joining both these proofs, we get a
forest proof of α ∧ (γ1 ∨ γ2) 0→ β ∧ (γ1 ∨ γ2).
Ad (R3). In view of (T3), a forest proof of α c→ β is also a forest proof of α d→ β,
where d > c.
Ad (R4). Let a forest proof of α c→ ⊥ be given. By Lemma 3.8 we can assume that
no leaf is inconsistent. We conclude that all leaves are >. Hence the proof forest is
actually a forest proof of α 0→ ⊥.
Ad (R5). Assume there are forest proofs of α c→ γ and β c→ γ. Then their union
is a forest proof of α ∨ β c→ γ.
Ad (R6). Assume there are forest proofs of α c→ β and β d→ γ. By Lemma 3.8,
we can assume that no terminal clause is inconsistent.
Assume first that β≈⊥. Then, as we have argued in case of the rule (R4), all leaves
of the first proof forest are >. Hence the first proof forest is a also forest proof of
α
c→ γ and hence of α c+d→ γ.
Assume second that β is not Boolean equivalent to⊥. Let L be a proper leaf of the
first proof. Then we can enlarge the proof forest by applications of (T4)(D) to L
such that each new leaf L′ includes a root L¯ of the second proof. We then connect
all children of L¯, together with the subtrees rooted at them, to L′. Proceeding in
the same way for all proper leafs of the first proof, we obtain a forest proof of
α
c+d→ γ.
We summarise that LAE proves an implication ζ r→ η from a theory T exactly if
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there exists a forest proof of ζ r→ η from T .
4 Quasimetric Boolean algebras
The propositions of our logic are interpreted by subsets of a quasimetric space.
Moreover, the degree to which an implication is defined to hold is determined by
the Hausdorff quasidistance, which assigns to any two elements of this algebra a
positive real.
In this context we are led to the following notion. Recall that a Boolean algebra B
is called separable if B is generated by a countable subset.
Definition 4.1. A quasimetric Boolean algebra is a pair (B, p) consisting of a
separable Boolean algebra (B;∧,∨,¬, 0, 1) and a mapping p : B × B → R¯+ such
that, for all A,B,C ∈ B,
(QB1) p(A,B) = 0 if and only if A 6 B.
(QB2) p(A ∨B,C) = p(A,C) ∨ p(B,C).
(QB3) p(A,B) 6 p(A,C) if C 6 B.
(QB4) p(A,C) 6 p(A,B) + p(B,C).
We note that the present notion should not be confused with the notion of a metric
Boolean algebra, which is usually meant to be a Boolean algebra together with a
measure on it.
The aim of this section is to establish a representation theorem for quasimetric
Boolean algebras. The Boolean algebra B will be represented by a set of subsets
of a set W and the quasimetric p on B by the Hausdorff quasidistance induced by
a quasimetric on W .
We will need in the sequel Stone’s representation theorem of Boolean algebras
[Sik]. Recall that a subset F of a Boolean algebra B is called a prime filter if (i)
a ∈ F and a 6 b imply b ∈ F , (ii) a ∧ b ∈ F for any a, b ∈ F , and (iii) for each
a ∈ B, exactly one of a and ¬ a is in F .
Theorem 4.2. Let (B;∧,∨,¬, 0, 1) be a Boolean algebra. Then there is a compact
topological space W such that B is isomorphic with (C;∩,∪, {,∅,W ), where C is
the set of clopen subsets of W .
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Proof (sketched). LetW be the set of prime filters ofB. Define ι : B → P(W ), a 7→
{F ∈ W : a ∈ F}. Then ι is an injective homomorphism from B to P(W ), en-
dowed with the set-theoretical operations.
Let furthermoreW be endowed with the coarsest topology whose open sets include
ι(a) for all a ∈ B. Then the image of B is the set of clopen subsets of W . Hence ι
induces an isomorphism as claimed.
Our representation theorem will not apply for quasimetric Boolean algebras in gen-
eral; we will assume two further properties.
Theorem 4.3. Let (B, p) be a quasimetric Boolean algebra such that the following
additional conditions are fulfilled.
(QB5) For all A,B,C ∈ B, there are AB, AC ∈ B such that A = AB ∨ AC
and p(A,B ∪ C) = p(AB, B) ∨ p(AC , C).
(QB6) For any sequence (Ai)i, from infi p(Ai, B) = 0 it follows Aj 6 B for
some j.
Then there exists a quasimetric space (W, q) and an injective Boolean homomor-
phism ι from B to the algebra of subsets of W such that
p(A,B) = q(ι(A), ι(B))
for all A,B ∈ B.
Proof. Let W be the compact topological space consisting of the prime filters of
B, such that B can be identified with the set of clopen sets endowed with the set-
theoretical operations. Note that, by construction, each sequence A0 ⊇ A1 ⊇ . . .
of elements of B has a non-empty intersection; and conversely, as B is separable,
there is for each w ∈W a sequence A0 ⊇ A1 ⊇ . . . in B such that
⋂
iAi = {w}.
For a ∈W and B ∈ B, we put
q(a,B) = inf
a∈A,
A∈B
p(A,B), (5)
and for a, b ∈W , we put
q(a, b) = sup
b∈B,
B∈B
q(a,B). (6)
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In the rest of the proof, we will omit the explicit reference to B; capital Latin letters
will always vary over elements of B. Our first aim is to show that q : W×W → R¯+
is a quasimetric.
To see (M1), let a, b ∈ W such that q(a, b) = 0. Let B be such that b ∈ B. Then
infa∈A p(A,B) = 0. Hence there is a sequence A0 ⊇ A1 ⊇ . . . such that a ∈ Ai
for all i and infi p(Ai, B) = 0. We conclude from (QB6) that p(Aj , B) = 0 for
some j; from (QB1) that Aj ⊆ B; and hence a ∈ B. As B is an arbitrary set
containing b, it follows a = b.
To see (M2), let a, b, c ∈W . We calculate
q(a, b) + q(b, c) = sup
b∈B
inf
a∈A
p(A,B) + sup
c∈C
inf
b∈B′
p(B′, C)
= sup
c∈C
inf
b∈B′
(sup
b∈B
inf
a∈A
p(A,B) + p(B′, C))
> sup
c∈C
inf
b∈B′
( inf
a∈A
p(A,B′) + p(B′, C))
= sup
c∈C
inf
b∈B′
inf
a∈A
(p(A,B′) + p(B′, C))
> sup
c∈C
inf
a∈A
p(A,C)
= q(a, b).
It remains to prove that
p(A,B) = sup
a∈A
inf
b∈B
q(a, b) (7)
holds for any A,B ∈ B. To this end, we first prove some auxiliary facts.
(a) Let a ∈W and B,C ∈ B. Then q(a,B ∪ C) = q(a,B) ∧ q(a,C).
By (QB3), q(a,B ∪ C) 6 q(a,B) ∧ q(a,C). Let ε > 0 and choose some A such
that a ∈ A and q(a,B∪C) 6 q(A,B∪C) 6 q(a,B∪C)+ε. By (QB5), there are
A′, A′′ such that A = A′∪A′′ and q(A′, B)∨ q(A′′, C) = q(A,B ∪C). If a ∈ A′,
we have q(a,B) 6 q(A′, B) 6 q(A,B∪C) 6 q(a,B∪C)+ε. Taking into account
the possibility a ∈ A′′ as well, we conclude q(a,B)∧ q(a,C) 6 q(a,B ∪C) + ε.
As ε is arbitrary, (a) follows.
(b) Let a ∈W and B ∈ B. Then q(a,B) = infb∈B q(a, b).
Clearly, q(a,B) 6 q(a, b) for any b ∈ B. Assume that c 6 q(a, b) for any
b ∈ B. Let ε > 0. For each b ∈ B, we have q(a, b) = supb∈C q(a,C) =
supb∈C, C⊆B q(a,C) and hence we may choose a Cb ⊆ B containing b such that
c 6 q(a,Cb) + ε. By compactness, there are finitely many elements b1, . . . , bk
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such that Cb1 ∪ . . .∪Cbk = B. We conclude c 6 q(a,Cb1)∧ . . .∧ q(a,Cbk) + ε =
q(a,B) + ε by (a). As ε is arbitrary, c 6 q(a,B), and (b) follows.
(c) Let A,B ∈ B. Then there is an a¯ ∈ A such that p(A,B) = q(a¯, B).
By the separability of B and by (QB2), there is a sequence A = A0 ⊃ A1 ⊃ . . .
in B such that ⋂iAi = {a¯} for some a¯ ∈ W and p(A,B) = p(Ai, B) for any i.
Then q(a¯, B) = inf a¯∈A′ p(A′, B) = infi p(Ai, B) = p(A,B) and (c) is shown.
We finally turn to the proof of (7). Let A,B ∈ B. By (c), there is an a¯ ∈ A such
that p(A,B) = q(a¯, B); consequently, p(A,B) = maxa∈A q(a,B). By (b), we
have q(a,B) = infb∈B q(a, b) for each a ∈ A. The assertion follows.
5 A completeness theorem for LAEq
This section contains the main result of the paper: we show that the calculus LAE
is complete with respect to the entailment relation of LAEq.
The proof of the completeness theorem will rely on the notion of a proof forest,
defined in Section 3, as well as on the representation of quasimetric Boolean alge-
bras, contained in Section 4. In addition, we will need a couple of auxiliary results
on proof forests (Lemma 5.1–5.8).
Lemma 5.1. Let T be a finite theory and let ζ, η be Boolean formulas such that
T ` ζ s→ η for some s ∈ R+. Then there is an r ∈ R+ with the following
properties: (i) r is the smallest value such that T ` ζ r→ η and (ii) r is a finite sum
of weights of implications in T .
Proof. Let LAE’ be the calculus obtained modifying LAE in the following way:
rule (R3) is dropped; and (R5) is replaced by
(R5’)
α
c→ γ β d→ γ
α ∨ β c∨d→ γ
.
Assume that, for some s ∈ R+, there is a proof of ζ s→ η from T in LAE.
From this proof, we drop every application of (R3) and decrease the weights of
the subsequent implications accordingly, such that a proof in LAE’ is obtained.
Let ζ s
′→ η be the proved implication. Then s′ 6 s and s′ is the sum of finitely
many reals each of which is the weights of some implication contained in T . This
proof may in turn transformed to a proof of ζ s
′→ in LAE. Indeed, we replace each
application of (R5’) by an application of (R3) followed by (R5).
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We conclude that if ζ s→ η is provable, then so is ζ s′→ η, where s′ is a sum of
elements of a finite set of positive reals. The assertions follow.
In the context of a forest proof, we will use the following additional notions. For
a non-terminal clause L, we say that a literal λ is introduced at L if L does not
contain λ, but some child of L does. Conversely, if L contains λ but no child of L
does so, we say that λ is dropped at L.
Furthermore, assume that the literal λ is contained in the non-terminal clause L
and one of the following conditions holds:
1. Case (A) or (B) of condition (T4) applies at L. Moreover, with reference to
the notation of Definition 3.5, λ is not among λ1, . . . , λn. Finally, if λ is con-
tained in the child of L indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, λ is one of µi1, . . . , µimi .
2. Case (C) applies at L. Moreover, L\{λ} is still inconsistent.
3. Case (D) applies at L. Moreover, λ is not contained in any children of L.
Then we call λ unused in L.
Lemma 5.2. Let there be a forest proof of ζ r→ η from T . Then there is a forest
proof of ζ r→ η from T such that there is no unused literal in any proper node.
Proof. Let the non-terminal clause L contain the unused literal λ. We remove λ
from L. Then, evidently, condition (A), (B), (C), or (D), respectively, applies to the
new node L\{λ} if this was the case before.
If L\{λ} is the root, we are done. Otherwise, let L′ be the father of L\{λ}. L′
still fulfils the requirements of (T4) except for the case that, in the original proof
forest, case (D) is applied to L′ and λ is one of ϕ or ¬ϕ, where ϕ is the splitting
variable. Then L′ has the child L\{λ} ⊆ L′ as well as a second child that contains
the negation of λ. We remove the latter together with the subtree rooted at it; and
we remove the node L\{λ} and connect its children directly to L′. Evidently, the
result is again a forest proof of ζ r→ η from T .
We repeat the same procedure as long as it is applicable.
Note what it means that a forest proof does not have any unused variables. Namely,
let L be a non-terminal clause in such a forest proof. In case (A), if L contains
any literal λ in addition to λ1, . . . , λn, then λ is also contained in a child, where
λ is not among the respective literals µi1, . . . , µiki . In case (B), we have L =
{λ1, . . . , λn}. In case (C), L = {ϕ,¬ϕ} for some variable ϕ. Finally, in case (D),
each λ ∈ L is also contained in one of the two children of L.
21
By a standard clause set for a Boolean formula α, we mean a clause set B such
that, for any variable ϕ, the following holds: if ϕ is contained in a clause ofB, then
ϕ occurs in α positively, and if ¬ϕ is contained in a clause of B, then ϕ occurs in
α negatively.
Lemma 5.3. Let there be a forest proof of ζ r→ η from T . Then there is a forest
proof of ζ r→ η from T such that the following holds. For each variable ϕ and each
root L, ϕ is contained in L only if ϕ positively occurs in ζ, and ¬ϕ is contained in
L only if ϕ negatively occurs in ζ. Similarly, for each variable ϕ and each leaf L,
ϕ is contained in L only if ϕ positively occurs in η, and ¬ϕ is contained in L only
if ϕ negatively occurs in η.
Proof. Let Bζ be a standard clause set for ζ. We construct a new forest proof as
follows. Let L be a clause in Bζ . Then L is chosen as a root of the new proof.
We apply to L (T4)(D) as many times as necessary such that eventually each leaf
includes a root of the original proof. For each such leaf L′, we connect to L′ all
children of the corresponding root of the original proof, together with the subtrees
rooted at them. Proceeding in the same way for each clause in Bζ , the requirement
of the first part of the lemma are fulfilled.
Let Bη be a standard clause set for η. Then we apply (T4)(D) at each leaf as many
times as necessary such that each leaf L includes a clause L¯ inBη. Next we replace
L with its subset L¯. If, in the original forest, (T4)(D) applied to the father L′ of
L and the splitting variable is now missing, we remove all descendants of L′, and
we apply the same procedure to L′, which then becomes a leaf including L¯. In this
way, we successively fulfil also the second part.
Lemma 5.4. Let there be a forest proof of ζ r→ η from T . Then there is a forest
proof such that the following holds. Let L be a non-terminal clause to which case
(D) of condition (T4) applies. Then the splitting variable ϕ does not occur in L.
Proof. Assume that ϕ does occur in L, that is, either ϕ or ¬ϕ is in L. Let then L′
be the child of L that is included in L. We remove all descendants of L and we
connect instead the children of L′ directly to L.
Proceeding in the same way in all applicable cases, we fulfil the requirements of
the lemma.
Lemma 5.5. Let there be a forest proof of ζ r→ η from T . Let ϕ be a variable that
does not occur negatively in ζ or in η; and for any implication α d→ β contained
in T , ϕ does not occur negatively in α or β. Then there is a forest proof in which
the literal ¬ϕ does not occur.
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A similar statement holds with respect to positive occurrences of ϕ.
Proof. We will show the first part; for the second part we can argue similarly.
Accordingly, assume that ϕ does not occur negatively in ζ or η, and for any element
of T given in the form (3), assume that the literal ¬ϕ does not occur.
Applying successively Lemmas 3.8, 5.4, 5.3, and 5.2, we can assume the follow-
ing additional properties of the forest proof under consideration: any inconsistent
clause has the only child >; (T4)(D) is not used when the splitting variable is al-
ready present; ¬ϕ does not occur in any root or leaf; and no unused literal occurs.
Assume that ¬ϕ occurs in the forest proof. Let L be a clause at which ¬ϕ is
introduced such that ¬ϕ is not introduced at any descendant of L. At L, only case
(D) can apply; hence L has two children L1 and L2 such that ϕ ∈ L1 and ¬ϕ ∈ L2.
Let S be the subtree whose root is L2 and that is maximal w.r.t. the property that
its nodes are clauses containing ¬ϕ. At the non-terminal nodes of S, then only
cases (A) or (D) can apply. Furthermore, at each leaf L′ of S, ¬ϕ is by assumption
dropped. This means that case (C) is applied to L′ = {ϕ,¬ϕ}.
We now modify the proof forest with the effect that ¬ϕ will no longer occur in any
descendant of L. We remove the subtree rooted at L1; and from each clause in S,
we drop ¬ϕ and add the elements of L instead. The former node L2 becomes L;
we replace the two coinciding nodes by a single one. Moreover, each leaf L′ of S
is now L ∪ {ϕ} and hence includes L1; we remove its only child > and connect
the subtrees rooted at the (former) children of L1, if there are any.
Since each weight in the subtree S is 0, the length of the modified proof forest is at
most the length of the original one; thus we obtain a proof forest of ζ r→ η from T
again. We proceed in the same way as long as the literal ¬ϕ is present.
It is the next lemma where we make use of the special properties of proof forests
that we have shown to be assumable.
Lemma 5.6. Let T be a basic theory. Then there is a basic theory T ′ including T
with the following property:
(E1) Let α, β, γ be Boolean formulas built up from variables that occur in
T . If T ` α d→ β ∨ γ for some d ∈ R+, then there are Boolean
formulas αβ, αγ such that the following is provable from T ′:
αβ
d→ β, αγ d→ γ, αβ 0→ α, αγ 0→ α, α 0→ αβ ∨ αγ . (8)
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(E2) Let ζ and η be Boolean formulas built up from variables that occur in
T . If T ′ ` ζ r→ η, then T ` ζ r→ η.
(E3) Every weight of an implication in T ′ is a finite sum of weights of impli-
cations in T .
Proof. Let (α, β, γ) be a triple of Boolean formulas built up from variables occur-
ring in T , such that α is the conjunction of literals. Assume that there is a d ∈ R+
such that T ` α d→ β ∨ γ. Assume furthermore that d is the smallest weight
with this property; such a weight exists by Lemma 5.1 and is a sum of weights of
implications contained in T . Assume finally that there are no two Boolean formu-
las αβ, αγ such that all five implications (8) are provable from T . Note that then
d > 0.
Let then αβ and αγ be variables that are not among those occurring in T and add
the five basic implications (8) to T . Let T ′ arise from T by proceeding for each
such triple in the indicated way, in each case using two new variables.
Then, by construction, T ′ fulfils (E1) restricted to conjunctions of literals α and
minimal weights d. We readily check that T ′ actually fulfils (E1) in general. It is
furthermore clear that T ′ fulfils also (E3).
To see that T ′ fulfils (E2), let ζ and η contain only variables present in T , and
assume that T ′ ` ζ r→ η. By Theorem 3.9, there is a forest proof of ζ r→ η from
T ′.
Let (α, β, γ) be one of the triples that gave rise to an extension of T ; let α be the
conjunction of the literals λα1 , . . . , λ
α
n, n > 1. That is, T ′ contains the implications
(8) and the variables αβ and αγ occur exactly in these five implications. Assume
that at least one of these variables occurs in the forest proof. We shall show that we
can eliminate αβ and αγ . We can proceed in the same way for every pair of newly
added variables and (E2) will follow.
By Lemma 5.5, we can assume that the proof forest does not contain the literals
¬αβ and ¬αγ . By Lemma 5.3, we can furthermore assume that the variables αβ
and αγ do not occur in the roots and leaves. By Lemma 5.2, we may finally assume
that there is no unused literal.
Let L be a clause at which αβ or αγ is introduced. Then case (A) of condition
(T4) applies to L and α 0→ αβ ∨ αγ is the used implication. In particular, L ⊇
{λα1 , . . . , λαn} and we can assume that L has exactly two children: the child L1
consisting of αβ and a subset of L, as well as the child L2 consisting of αγ and a
subset of L. Let S1 be the subtree whose root is L1 and that is maximal w.r.t. the
property that each node is proper and contains αβ . Similarly, let S2 be the subtree
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S2 whose root is L2 and that is maximal w.r.t. the property that each node is proper
and contains αγ . Note that all weights in S1 and S2 are 0. Moreover, at each leaf
of S1, αβ is dropped on the basis of αβ
0→ α or αβ d→ β; similarly for S2. We
modify the proof forest as follows.
Case 1: At all leaves of S1, case (A) is applied on the basis of αβ
0→ α. Then
we remove the subtree rooted at L2. Furthermore, in each node of S1, we replace
αβ by λα1 , . . . , λ
α
n. As a consequence, some nodes L
′ have a child L′′ ⊆ L′; this
is the case where, in the original proof forest, case (A) applies on the basis of
α
0→ αβ ∨ αγ or αβ 0→ α. We then remove the descendants of L′ and connect the
children of L′′ directly to L′.
Case 2: At all leaves of S2, case (A) is applied on the basis of αγ
0→ α. Then we
proceed similarly as in Case 1.
Case 3: There is a leaf L′1 = {αβ} of S1 at which case (B) is applied on the basis
of αβ
d→ β, and a leaf L′2 = {αγ} of S2 at which case (B) is applied on the basis
of αγ
d→ γ. We then remove all descendants from L and connect to L instead the
subtrees rooted at the children of L′1 and L′2 with weight d. Then condition (B)
applies to L, the used implication being α d→ β ∨ γ.
We finally apply Lemma 5.2 to ensure that there are no unused literals, and we
repeat the same procedure as long as the variables αβ and αγ occur.
Lemma 5.6 was only a preparatory step for the subsequent Lemma, which contains
the key argument for the proof of the completeness theorem for LAEq. Namely,
we show that a theory T can be extended to a theory T¯ such that condition (E1)
applies for all implications of the form α d→ β ∨ γ provable from T¯ , not only for
those provable in the original theory T .
Lemma 5.7. Let T be a basic theory. Then there is a basic theory T¯ including T
with the following property:
(F1) Let α, β, γ be Boolean formulas built up from variables that occur in
T¯ . If T¯ ` α d→ β ∨ γ for some d ∈ R+, then there are Boolean
formulas αβ, αγ such that T¯ proves the following:
αβ
d→ β, αγ d→ γ, αβ 0→ α, αγ 0→ α, α 0→ αβ ∨ αγ . (9)
(F2) Let ζ and η be Boolean formulas built up from variables that occur in
T . If T¯ ` ζ r→ η, then T ` ζ r→ η.
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(F3) Every weight of an implication in T¯ is a finite sum of weights of impli-
cations in T .
Proof. We put T0 = T , and for each i > 0, we let Ti+1 = T ′i , the extension of Ti
according to Lemma 5.6. We put T¯ = ⋃i Ti.
Let Φ be an implication containing only variables occurring in T¯ . If T¯ ` Φ, there
is an i such that Φ contains only variables occurring in Ti and Ti proves Φ. Thus
(F1) holds by condition (E1) of Lemma 5.6. Furthermore, assume T¯ ` ζ r→ η,
where the variables occurring in ζ and η all occur in T . Then Ti ` ζ r→ η for
some i. By condition (E2) of Lemma 5.6, if i > 1, Ti−1 ` ζ r→ η, and arguing
subsequently in the same way we conclude that in fact T proves ζ r→ η, and (F2)
follows. An inductive argument also shows (F3).
The extension of a basic theory specified by Lemma 5.7 is easily seen to fulfil
Lemma 5.1 as well.
Lemma 5.8. Let T be a finite theory and let T¯ be the extension of T according to
Lemma 5.7. Let ζ, η be Boolean formulas such that T¯ ` ζ s→ η for some s ∈ R+.
Then there is an r ∈ R+ with the following properties: (i) r is the smallest value
such that T¯ ` ζ r→ η and (ii) r is a finite sum of weights of implications in T .
Proof. By condition (F3) of Lemma 5.7, each weight of an implication contained
in T¯ is a sum of weights of implications contained in the finite theory T . Hence
we can argue as in the proof of Lemma 5.1.
We finally arrive at our main result.
Theorem 5.9. Let T be a finite theory and Φ an implication. Then T proves Φ in
LAE if and only if T semantically entails Φ in LAEq.
Proof. The “only if” part holds by Proposition 3.2.
To see the “if” part, assume that T does not prove the implication ζ r→ η. Let T¯
the extension of T according to Lemma 5.7. By (F2), then also T¯ does not prove
ζ
r→ η.
For Boolean formulas α and β built up from variables occurring in T¯ , we put now
α 4 β if T¯ ` α 0→ β, and we put α ≈ β if α 4 β and β 4 α. Then ≈ is
an equivalence relation inducing a Boolean algebra B. Note that B is separable
because the number of variables is countable.
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We denote the ≈-class of a Boolean formula α by 〈α〉. For each pair 〈α〉, 〈β〉 ∈ B,
we put
p(〈α〉, 〈β〉) = min {t ∈ R¯+ : T¯ ` α t→ β}, (10)
the existence of the minimum being ensured by Lemma 5.8. We shall write in the
sequel simply “p(α, β)” instead of “p(〈α〉, 〈β〉)”. For any pair of Boolean formulas
α, β and d ∈ R+, we have by (10)
T¯ ` α d→ β if and only if p(α, β) 6 d. (11)
We have to show that p fulfils the conditions (QB1)–(QB6). By Lemmas 4.3 and
2.3(ii), it will then follow that there is a model such that all elements of T¯ , thus in
particular all elements of T , are satisfied, but ζ r→ η is not.
(QB1): By (11), we have p(α, β) = 0 iff T¯ ` α 0→ β iff 〈α〉 6 〈β〉.
(QB2): For any d ∈ R+, we have p(α∨β, γ) 6 d iff T¯ ` α∨β d→ γ iff T¯ ` α d→ γ
and T¯ ` β d→ γ iff p(α, β) ∨ p(α, γ) 6 d.
(QB3): Assume that 〈γ〉 6 〈β〉. Then T¯ ` γ 0→ β and hence p(α, β) 6 p(α, γ).
(QB4): Let p(α, β) 6 d and p(β, γ) 6 e. Then T¯ d+e→ γ and thus p(α, γ) 6 d+ e.
It follows p(α, γ) 6 p(α, β) + p(β, γ).
(QB5): Assume that p(α, β ∨ γ) 6 d. Then T¯ ` α d→ β ∨ γ, and by condition
(F1) of Lemma 5.7, there are Boolean formulas αβ, αγ such that α ≈ αβ ∨ αγ
and T¯ ` αβ d→ β, αγ d→ γ, that is, p(αβ, β), p(αγ , γ) 6 d. We conclude
that 〈αβ〉, 〈αγ〉 ∈ B are such that 〈α〉 = 〈αβ〉 ∨ 〈αγ〉 and p(αβ, β) ∨ p(αγ , γ) 6
p(α, β ∨ γ).
To complete the proof of (QB5), we have to show that the last inequality is in fact
an equality. Let e = p(αβ, β) ∨ p(αγ , γ); then p(αβ, β) 6 e and p(αγ , γ) 6 e
implies T¯ ` αβ e→ β and T¯ ` αγ e→ γ, hence T¯ ` αβ ∨ αγ e→ β ∨ γ and
T¯ ` α e→ β ∨ γ, that is, p(α, β ∨ γ) 6 e.
(QB6): Let 〈α0〉, 〈α1〉, . . . , 〈β〉 ∈ B be such that infi p(αi, β) = 0. By Lemma
5.8, the smallest non-zero element in the image of p is the smallest among the non-
zero weights of the implications in T . Since T is finite, we conclude that there is a
j such that p(αj , β) = 0. By (QB1), we have 〈αj〉 6 〈β〉.
A final note concerns the notion of a min-space, which was mentioned in the Sec-
tion 2. The countermodel constructed in the proof of Theorem 5.9 is in fact a
min-space. The quasimetric p, defined by (10), has by Lemma 5.8 the property
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that, given any u > 0, the image of p contains only finitely many values smaller
than u. The image of the quasimetric q, defined by (5) and (6), is consequently
contained in the image of p; hence q has the same property. We conclude that The-
orem 5.9 still holds if we modify the definition of LAEq restricting the models to
min-spaces.
6 Conclusion
The logic of approximate entailment, which goes back to E. Ruspini [Rus], is based
on an idea that is as simple as convincing. The aim is to make precise what it means
for a property α to imply another property β approximately. Assume that α and
β correspond to subsets A and B, respectively, of a set of worlds W . Following
[Rus], all what we need to add is a distance function on W , that is, a map d as-
signing a value to pairs of worlds that reasonably measures their distinctness. Then
α is considered to imply β to the degree of imprecision d if A is a subset of the
d-neighbourhood of B.
To associate with this idea a logic on semantic grounds is straightforward; to ax-
iomatise this logic, however, turns out to be difficult. Those few sound rules that
are listed in Definition 3.1 are easily found; to continue on this basis is a challenge.
Our question has been if this small set of rules is not already sufficient to axioma-
tise a logic of the mentioned kind. We have given an affirmative answer for the
case where the models are quasimetric spaces.
We may certainly say that the road to this goal was stony. It was necessary to
develop the basis of a proof theory for the proposed calculus and to prove quite an
amount of auxiliary lemmas. Future efforts in this area might well aim at different
techniques, so that the proof of our completeness theorem could be shortened.
The present work gives rise to a considerable amount of open problems. First
to mention, our completeness theorem covers finite theories; the case of infinite
theories is open. We note that we may hardly proceed along the same lines as we
did here; our procedure heavily relies on the finiteness assumption.
Second, we have introduced in [EGRV] a counterpart to the logic considered here,
called the Logic of Strong Entailment, or LSE for short. Whereas in LAEq impli-
cational relationships holding only approximately are considered, LSE not only
requires implications to hold exactly, but even to be invariant under quantified
changes. We wonder if a proof calculus along the present lines could be found
for LSE as well.
Another question might not lead to immediate results, but should be explored
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nonetheless. The models constructed in the present context are, from the point
of view of applications, somewhat unnatural; the image of the distance function
contains only finitely many values below any given m ∈ R+. We ask if there is
a logic of approximate entailment that corresponds more closely to the common
situation that the set of world is (a subset of) Rn, endowed with the Euclidean
metric.
Speaking about the Euclidean metric, we are finally led to the probably most signif-
icant open problem in the present context. What we have in mind is the symmetry
of the distance function. Does our completeness theorem still hold if we restrict to
metric spaces, that is, those spaces that are based on a symmetric quasimetric? We
conjecture that the answer is positive. We guess that proof-theoretical methods,
however, are not suitable to deal with this case. We propose to examine instead
the question if quasimetric spaces can be suitably embedded in metric spaces, such
that the quasimetric of the former corresponds to the Hausdorff quasimetric of the
latter space. A result of this kind is contained in [Vit]; unfortunately, the proposed
representation seems not to be applicable in the present context and an independent
approach needs to be found.
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